TRADE DRESS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION:
The problem manifests itself when competitors try
to use the powerful weapons
embodied in Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to protect
unregistered trademarks, including "trade dress," from being
copied by competitors. The argument flows that use or adoption
by a competitor of a deceptively similar "trade dress" to that of
the plaintiff's will cause confusion amongst consumers about the
source of the goods. The competitor will be unjustly benefited
from a consumer's perceived association of the products of the
competitor with those of the plaintiff. Product manufacturers
and marketers have been using the provisions of the Lanham Act to
protect their products and markets, as well as, to harass and
prevent other competitors from attempting to compete with them
with increasing frequency.
"Trade dress" refers to the appearance of a product.
The trade dress laws protect "primarily" non-functional features
of a product and those functional features which have developed
secondary meaning, i.e., have come to be associated by consumers
as products from a source, as distinguished from the products of
others. Functional features are defined as those that are
essential for the use or purpose of the product, and those which
affect its cost or quality. To determine if a feature is
functional, it must be assessed in the overall design and it need
not be analyzed individually.
If a plaintiff can establish that one or more of the
features of his product are non-functional and have achieved
secondary meaning, or source identifying significance, it can
prevent competitors from adopting and using those features.
Even the innocent adoption of features which are confusingly, or
deceptively, similar to those which are protectible under the
Lanham Act can be enjoined. The only countervailing
consideration to such broad protection for functional features is
the constitutional concern against hindering competition, or of
"impinging on the rights of others to compete in the sale of
products". These concerns, however, are overcome when alternative
designs are available. Where there are no alternative designs,
the features are deemed essential or utilitarian and they can be
freely copied or used.
In the Fuddruckers case, plaintiff Fuddruckers, Inc.
sought to use Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to protect various
elements of its restaurant design and decor. Fuddruckers claimed
that its design concept had come to be associated in the minds of
consumers with a single source, namely itself, and that the
adoption by Doc's B.R. Others, Inc. of a similar decor and design
concept was misleading and confusingly similar. By this case,
Fuddruckers sought to expand trade dress protection to "elements
employed in marketing restaurant services". The case was tried
before a jury and the jury held that a restaurant's decor, menu
layout and style of service may acquire source identifying
significance and thereby become protectible trade dress, but that
Fuddruckers trade dress had not acquired secondary meaning in the
Phoenix area at the time that Doc's opened. The jury also held
that there was no likelihood of confusion between the two
establishments.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for retrial
because the trial court had failed to issue any jury instructions
on functionality and because the trial court had ordered that
Fuddruckers must show that it had achieved secondary meaning in
the Phoenix area. The trial court also erred by failing to
instruct the jury that even reverse confusion, i.e., belief by
consumers that Fuddruckers was associated with Doc's, as opposed
to the other way around, would be sufficient to establish a
likelihood of confusion.
The Ninth Circuit, however, failed to decide whether
plaintiff or defendant must carry the burden of functionality,
leaving that issue unresolved. Decisions in other circuits have
held that functionality is a defense for which defendant carries
the burden, but at least one recent decision out of the district
court of New Jersey has placed that burden on the plaintiff. In
that case the plaintiff was required to show that his claimed
trade dress was protectible under the Lanham Act.
In the Fuddruckers case the Ninth Circuit also required
that the functionality analysis focus on the whole collection of
elements taken together, since independent elements may be
functional with a whole being found non-functional. The court
held that a plaintiff "cannot prevent others from using any
particular color or feature, but can protect a combination of
visual elements 'that taken together . . . may create a
distinctive visual impression'." Applying this test, a plaintiff
must show, if the burden is his, that the competitors product
creates a similar visual impression to his, and that the
competitors product will function just as well without the
similar features. Plaintiff would also have to show that the
cost or quality of the product are not affected by not
incorporating those features. A defendant, if the burden is his,
would have to show that there are few, if any, alternate choices
and that the cost, quality and utility of the product would be
affected if the use of the features is prohibited. The Ninth
Circuit properly held that functionality is a question of fact.
The second crucial factor required for a trade dress to
be protectable, a showing of secondary meaning, or source
identifying significance in the claimed combination of features.
In the Fuddruckers case, Fuddruckers claimed trade dress rights
in the concept of open food preparation areas visible to
customers, glassed-in display cases for its various food items,
bulk storage of food items in customer areas, use of bulk size
containers for its soft drinks, cheeses in crockpots, and
institutional sized containers of condiments. Fuddruckers also
uses ubiquitous two-by-four white tiles on its walls, bar and
counters, as well as neon signs, many mirrors, brown and white
checked flooring and tablecloths, directors chairs and exterior
yellow awning. Fuddruckers claimed it need not establish
secondary meaning because its trade dress was "inherently
distinctive" and federal registration of service marks is
available for "inherently distinctive" service marks without
proof of secondary meaning. The Ninth Circuit noted that the
term "inherent distinctiveness" is merely a term of art
describing any mark which has acquired secondary meaning, but it
did offer a definition for the term independent of that
observation. The court held that "inherent distinctiveness"
means "arbitrary or uncommon," but that Fuddruckers trade dress
was not inherently distinctive.
The secondary meaning requirement was also tested
against Fuddruckers' claim that it need not establish secondary
meaning in the Phoenix area and Doc's claim that it must. The
Ninth Circuit acknowledged the rule allowing co-existence of
remote good faith users of a similar or identical mark, but it
also recognized that that rule has limited, or no applicability,
where the services involved are ambulatory, or where consumers
may be exposed to both service providers. The Ninth Circuit
therefore imposed a requirement that Fuddruckers show that it had
established its secondary meaning among some "substantial portion
of consumers nationally".
Of interest is the fact that although Fuddruckers
claimed to be a national restaurant chain, it has only penetrated
a limited number of regional markets. As a result, the Ninth
Circuit's decision to use a national arena creates more havoc
than it sorts. Arguably, any enterprise might be able to avoid
having to show that it has achieved secondary meaning in a
particular market where it claims rights by simply arguing that
it intended to be "national" in scope and hopes at some point to
ultimately achieve its objective.
Ultimately, there is no recognized standard on how
secondary meaning can be established. Some courts have found
that evidence of copying is sufficient to establish secondary
meaning. The courts rationalize there would be "no reason to
copy a non-functional feature except to capitalize on an already
existing secondary meaning". The Ninth Circuit in Fuddruckers
agreed that copying is relevant to infer secondary meaning but
held that the burden of proof on secondary meaning did not shift
where intentional copying is found. The court noted that copying
can be justified by economic benefits of functional features
which constitute the trade dress.
The final hurdle that a plaintiff must leap to win a
trade dress infringement action is to prove the existence of a
likelihood of confusion. If there is no likelihood of confusion,
the competitor may not be enjoined even if the plaintiff's trade
dress is protectible and has achieved secondary meaning. Some
courts however will use the existence of the likelihood of
confusion to infer the existence of secondary meaning.
A likelihood of confusion, whether direct or reverse,
can be shown by (a) the existence of actual confusion; (b) intent
of the competitor to copy in adopting the mark; (c) similarities
of the marks; (d) similarities of the products; (e) similarities
of the marketing channels; and (f) the strength of the mark. As
the Ninth Circuit noted, an intent to copy is given great weight
in likelihood of confusion analyses. In some cases courts will
even use similarity of the products to infer copying and an
intent to copy.
And so the apparently awesome task for the plaintiff in
trade dress cases in fact turns out to be a collapsible standard.
Where there is similarity of products, an intentional copying can
be inferred, which in turn has been used by some courts to infer
the existence of a likelihood of confusion and secondary meaning.
As a result, since many of these same courts will impose the
burden of proof on functionality on the defendant, all that
plaintiff needs do is file his complaint and allege similarity of
the products and intentional copying and wait and watch the
defendant try to squirm out of that one. Section 43(a) actions
under the Lanham Act are indeed a powerful competitive tool.
It is unclear whether Congress intended 43(a) to be so
expansive. There is no doubt that 43(a) was intended to be an
effective tool against unfair competition but was it intended to
create the mayhem it does? That which is not protected by patent
or copyright can be freely copied, at least according to the
United States Supreme Court. The provisions of the Lanham Act
however, have created new protections for otherwise unprotectable
subject matter. Trade dress rights established under the Lanham
Act are perpetual in nature, and are not limited in time as are
patent and copyright interests.
Competitors are being forced to be highly defensive in
developing products to avoid liability for trade dress
infringement. For example, they should conduct market studies of
existing products, compare the features of their intended product
with those of existing products and assess the functionality of
the features within the whole design. They must adopt
alternative designs where possible, and attempt to avoid the
consequences of litigation by seeking advice of counsel familiar
with product design, intellectual property rights and competitive
business practice litigation early in the development stages.
Until the courts apply more uniform standards and
analysis in trade dress cases, and until limitations to the use
of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act are better defined, plaintiffs
will continue to lay claim to product features and combinations
of such features. In the long run, the "winner" will probably
not be the "innovator" or the aggressive "marketer" who actually
came up with the unique product designs, or actually established
genuine consumer acceptance for the product. The winner will be
the aggressive litigator who can early restrict the range of
product development of his competitors.
P>
WHO HAS THE RULE BOOK?
by
Sheldon Mak Rose & Anderson
To say, as the Ninth Circuit recently did in
Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837
(1987), that trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act is a
complicated area of law, is a considerable understatement. The
reality is that trade dress and unfair competition litigation is
a confused area of the law. No one really knows what the rules
are, and they change from circuit to circuit. The Ninth Circuit
recently wrestled with the problem in an attempt to bring some
order to the mayhem.
Sheldon Mak Rose & Anderson PC
100 E. Corson Street, Third Floor
Pasadena, California 91103-3842
626-796-4000
626-795-6321 fax