USE OF PERSONAL NAME AS TRADEMARK
Under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(e), a mark which
is "primarily merely a surname" is not federally registrable on
the Principal Register without proof of secondary meaning. Such
marks can be registered on the Supplemental Register without such
proof. The Patent and Trademark Office generally defines
"primarily merely a surname" liberally in favor of the trademark
applicant, holding that a word is "primarily merely a surname"
only if the only significance of the word to the public is as a
surname. This is a subjective test, looking at the probable
reaction of consumers in the marketplace.
When an applicant attempts to register what might in
fact be a surname, the initial burden of proof is on the Patent
and Trademark Office to establish a prima facie case that the
word is primarily merely a surname. The most common showing made
is that there are an "unusually large number" of telephone
directory listings of the word as a surname. This is, of course,
not the only factor. Even a relatively rare surname not found in
most telephone books can still be "primarily merely a surname" if
by their very nature they could have only a surname significance.
Examples have included "Seidenberg" for cigars and "Dourthe" for
wine.
Other factors are also relevant in determining whether
a questionable mark should be regarded as primarily merely a
surname. For example, if the word is actually the name of the
applicant or someone in the applicant's organization, it is much
more likely to be considered a surname. If initials, a first
name, or a term indicating family significance, such as "and
Sons" or the French "et Fils" is used with the word, it is also
much more likely to be considered a surname. By contrast, if the
word does have significance other than as a surname, then
registration on the Principal Register is allowed without proof
of secondary meaning. Such marks have included "Bird" for radios
and "Kent" for cigarettes.
If proof of secondary meaning is required, it can be in
any of the usual forms. For example, evidence of the amount and
nature of advertising of the mark, the length of time of use of
the mark, and the volume of sales under the mark can establish
secondary meaning. Under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(f),
proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use of a mark for
five years preceding application for registration can be accepted
as prima facie evidence of secondary meaning. Other evidence of
secondary meaning can come from declarations or affidavits by
retailers or consumers, or from a survey. In either case, care
must be taken to ensure that the opinion of the relevant audience
is being sampled. If the relevant buyer class is retail
consumers, testimony from wholesalers or retailers can be
irrelevant.
The requirement of a written consent to register is not
met by the mere existence of a consent to use the name. The
consent must in fact be a consent to register the mark in
question. In fact, even a license to use the name as a mark is
not sufficient if a written consent to register is not filed.
It is not necessary to obtain a written consent in a
case in which a coined name is used as a mark but the coined name
happens to be identical to one held by a particular individual.
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has held that this section
of the Lanham Act is triggered only if the individual bearing
that name would be associated with the goods, either because that
person is so well known to the general public that the public
would assume that the mark identifies that celebrity, or because
the person bearing that name is publicly connected with the
business in which the mark is used. The latter situation, of
course, can occur because of advertising or publicity by the
business itself that links that individual with the business.
If written consent to register a mark should be filed
and is not filed, the consequences can be severe for the party
owning the mark. When the mark is published for opposition, the
mark can be successfully opposed by the person so identified or
anyone else with sufficient standing on the ground of failure to
file such a written consent. Even if the mark is registered, a
failure to file a written consent can still be used as a basis to
cancel an already-registered mark. In fact, defenses such as
laches, acquiescence, or estoppel that are effective against many
grounds for cancellation are ineffective when a written consent
has to be filed and was not. Even the incontestability of the
mark does not provide any defense to such a basis for
cancellation. In fact, the failure to file such a written
consent leaves the mark voidable ab initio.
CAN BE REWARDING, YET RISKY
by
Sheldon Mak Rose & Anderson
Many owners of new businesses would like to use their
own name, or the name of someone associated with the business, as
their trademark. Although many of the strongest trademarks in
American commerce did originate as surnames, such as "Ford,"
"Chevrolet," and "Chrysler" in the automobile industry, the use
of a personal name as a trademark can cause unexpected pitfalls. Personal Name Treated as Descriptive
When a personal name is used as a trademark, it is
treated by the Patent and Trademark Office and the courts as a
descriptive term, with proof of secondary meaning or
distinctiveness required for either protection as a trademark by
the courts or federal registration with the Patent and Trademark
Office. The most likely reason for this requirement is that the
use of a personal name as a mark does not pinpoint one individual
source of goods without proof of distinctiveness and should not
be the basis for preventing others with the same or a similar
name from using it in their own businesses. For example, if a
person surnamed "Smith" starts a business and puts that name on
his goods as a trademark, the use of "Smith" merely describes to
the public that someone surnamed "Smith" has something to do with
the goods. Which Smith, the public does not know, and there may
be more than one person with that surname in the same business.
Therefore, to gain trademark status, proof of distinctiveness or
secondary meaning must be shown as an indication that the public
regards the goods marked "Smith" as coming from a single source. Consent to Register Must Be Filed
Under 15 U.S.C. 1052(c), a mark which "consists or
comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular
living individual" requires that the written consent of that
individual must be filed with the Patent and Trademark Office for
the registration to be valid. The mark in question need not be a
full name. It can be a surname only, a given name, or even a
nickname, as long as it identifies a particular living
individual. Nor will the addition of other material to the name,
such as a brief description of the product, relieve the
requirement for the filing of a written consent. Conclusion
Although a personal name can be an effective trademark,
any attorney who seeks to ensure the maximum degree of protection
for such a mark must take certain precautions:
If these precautions are met, marks based on personal
names can prove an effective means of trademark protection whose
scope can grow with the enterprise bearing the personal name.
Sheldon Mak Rose & Anderson PC
100 E. Corson Street, Third Floor
Pasadena, California 91103-3842
626-796-4000
626-795-6321 fax